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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

EvmENCE-ScoPE OF THE BusrnEss ENTRY ExcEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RuLE UNDER PRESENT STATUTORY MODIFICATION-The
business entry exception to the hearsay evidence rule has been prolific
of legal literature and litigation.1 Originally the law regarded all

1 "Whole monographs have been written on it." HANDBOOK OF THE NAT. CoNF.
OF CoMMS. ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 350 (1936). The Committee of the Commonwealth Fund of New York collected over 1,800 cases, MoRGAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 53 (1927). See also: annotations collected in 144 A.L.R. 727 at 731 (1943);
52 L.R.A. 545 (1901); cases and comments coll'"cted in Radtke v. Taylor, 105 Ore.
559, 210 P. 863 (1922); Kinnare, "Account Books as Evidence in Illinois," l'I CHI.

COMMENTS

business entries as inadmissible in evidence to prove the truth of the
facts recorded. 2 However, at early common law the shopkeeper could
not himself testify to the truth of a transaction, since he was an interested party; and if he kept no clerk, or his clerk were unavailable, no
one else could so testify. 3 In response to this evidentiary dilemma
there appeared a double-barreled exception to the hearsay rule; namely, that business entries by a party (The Shopbook Rule), and business
entries by a third person (The Regular Entries Rule) were admissible
to prove their truth.4 Courts and legislatures so fused and confused the
two rules, however, that their application in any given case became
highly unpredictable. 5 In addition, admission of a business entry was
conditioned upon meeting certain technical prerequisites,6 which, as
business grew in size and complexity, often became impossible or impracticable of attainment.7 Hence, rules, which originated in aid of the
litigant who was bereft of proof, so developed that Justice Cardozo
could say in summation "that many of the simplest things of life,
transactions so common as the sale and delivery of merchandise, are
often the most difficult to prove." 8
KENT L. REV. 278 (1933); Metz, "Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act,"
6 UNiv. PrIT. L.-REv. 9 (1939); 47 HARV. L. REv. 1044 (1934); 24 lowA L.
REV. 751 (1939); 24 MINN. L. REV. 958 (1940); 54 YALE L.J. 868 (1945).
2
An early English practice of admitting such entries despite their hearsay character was prohibited by statute in 1609. 5 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1517
(1940).
8
Tracy, "Introduction of Documentary Evidence," 24 lowA L. REv. 436 at
454 (1939).
4
5 WJGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1517 et seq. (1940).
5
MoRGAN, THE LAw oF EvIDENCE, c. 5 (1927); 24 lowA L. REV. 751
(1939). When the Supreme Court, in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct.
4 77 ( I 943), was called upon to interpret the federal statute, based on the Model Act,
the Court added to the confusion by likening the statute to a liberalized version of
the early shop book rule, whereas in truth the basis was the regular entries rule.
See Morgan, "The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945," 59 HARV. L. REv. 481 (1946).
Some of the lower federal courts have fallen into the same error. In Clainos v. United
States, (App. D.C. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 593, the federal statute was called simply the
"Federal Shopbook Rule."
6
Summarized by Professor Wigmore, 5 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1521
et seq. (1940).
7
An insistence on the necessity of calling as witnesses all persons who had a part
in making the entries, robbed the exception of most of its vitality. Impartial investigation disclosed that to compile a record of a completed sale of linoleum one concern
would make use of 43 persons, who might be any of 150 individuals, many of whom
could never be identified. 5 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1520 (d) (1940).
Judge Learned Hand commented, " .•. nobody need ever pay a debt, if ouly his
creditor does a large enough business." Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1927) 18 F. (2d) 934 at 937.
8
Cardozo, "A Ministry of Justice," 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 at 121 (1921). "A
man from up-state comes down to Detroit, goes to a hotel, has meals ••. sent to his
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Statutory Modification
Long awaited reform began in r927 when the Committee of the
Commonwealth Fund of New York brought forth their Model Act
for the Proof of Business Transactions.° Utilizing experience gained
under this act, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved in
r936 a Uniform Act on Business Records.10 Admittedly a prime purpose of both these statutory modifications has been to relieve the burden
cast on litigants by the common law, which required as a precedent
to admitting business entries that witnesses, speaking from personal
knowledge, trace the transaction every step of the way.11 Often overlooked, however, has been a purpose to widen the sc9pe of admissible
entries.12 The breadth given to the terms "business" and "business
entries" by the statutory definitions has operated to extend the exception
into fields not hitherto encompassed by it. The adoption of one or the
other of these acts by twenty states, and by the United States, has rendered timely a consideration of their present area of operation. So
I.

room, orders some laundry sent out, has some long distance calls, sends some telegrams,
and goes out to a store and buys some merchandise and has it charged to the hotel and
the hotel pays the bill; he buys newspapers; everything is charged to his room. Then
he slips out of the hotel without paying. He goes back home and they sue him at his
residence some 400 miles distant from the hotel. How ••• , under strict principles
of evidence, are they ever going to prove that case against him?_ Will they bring the
bell boy, arid the woman who did the laundry and the cigar clerk and all the rest?"
Tracy, "Some Problems in the Introduction of Documentary Evidence," PROCEEDINGS,
M1cH. LAw ScHOOL INSTITUTE 280 at 299 (1940).
9
The definitive scope of the act is as follows: "Any writing or record, whether
in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of
:iny act, transaction, occurrence or event shall be admissible in evidence •••• The term
business shall include business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind."
MoRGAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 63 (1927). Adopted substantially in the following
jurisdictions: Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois (only in Chicago Municipal Court by
Rule 70), Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan; New York, Rhode Island, Wisconsin,
and all federal courts. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1520 (d) (1940); id.
§ 1520 (Supp., 1947).
10
Of which the definitive provisions are: "Section I. (Definition) The term
"business" shall include every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether carried on for profit or not. Section 2. (Business Records)
A record of an act, condition or event shall, • • . , be competent evidence. • • ." 9
U.L.A. 264 ( I 942). Adopted substantially in: California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Vermont, and Wyoming, 9 U.L.A. 64 (Supp., 1946).
11
Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) II5 F. (2d) 492; Loper
v. Morrison, 23 Cal. (2d) 600, 145 P. (2d) I (1944); Bethlehem-Sparrows Point
"Shipyard Inc. v. Scherpenisse, (Md. 1946) 50 A. (2d) 256; 5 W1GMORE, EvIDENcE,
3d ed., § 1530 (a} (1940):
·
12
Henderson v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 65 Idaho 570, 149 P. (2d) 133
(1944); Gile v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358, 272 N.W. 706 (1937); Douglas Creditor's
Assn. v. Padelford, (Ore. 1947) 182 P. (2d) 390.
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similar are the acts in definitive terms,13 and so interchangeably have
the courts cited them, 14 that for this purpose nothing would be gained
by a two-way classification of cases according to statute.

Scope of the Modification
a. Business records. The common law exception concerned itself
primarily with the sale transaction, but limited proof thereof to records made in books of original entry. 15 Under the statutes a business
using complex accounting systems may now, in a proper case, introduce the original sales ticket or entry, the "Hard Sheets" or loose
leaf ledger to which the transactions may next be transferred, and, of
course, the final "books of account." 16
Another troublesome restriction at common law was the limitation
of admissible entries to those made primarily in "books of account." 11
The extent to which this concept has been relaxed is illustrated by the
recent inclusion of an air mail stamp, affixed in the regular course of business, within the exception.18 In addition, the scope has been expanded so
as to permit the introduction of bank books, a composition book, the history sheet of a corporate trustee, and employment records. 19 Index
cards of various sorts, such as a broker's card listing property for sale,
cards listing insurance and rental receipts, a hotel registration card, and
the time card of an employee have been admitted. 20 Admissible also
2.

18

Notes 9 and 10, supra.
Loper v. Morrison, 23 Cal. (2d) 600, 145 P. (2d) I (1944); Henderson v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 65 Idaho 570 1 149 P. ( 2d) 133 (1944); 35 CAL. L. REV.
434 (1947); 24 MINN. L. REv. 958 (1940).
15
5 W1cMORE, EvmENCE, 3d ed., § 1532 (1940).
16
Upon a proper showing: sales ticket admitted absent statute, a fortiorari admissible under statute, Maney v. Cherry, 170 Okla. 469, 41 P. (2d) 82 (1935);
"Hard Sheets," Thompson v. Machado, 78 Cal. App. 870, 178 P. (2d) 838 (1947);
Loose leaf ledger, H.F. Shepherdson Co. v. Central Fire Ins. Co., 220 Minn. 401,
19 N.W. (2d) 772 (1945); "Books of Account," Robinson v. Puls, 28 Cal. (2d) 664,
171 P. (2d) 430 (1946); People v. Jones, 61 Cal. App. (2d) 608, 143 P. (2d) 726
(1943); Grogan v. Michael, 349 Pa. 369, 37 A. (2d) 715 (1944).
17
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1532 (1940).
18
United States v. Leathers, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 507.
19
Bank books, Crowley v. Atkinson's Estate, 297 Mich. 15, 296 N.W. 864
(1941); composition book, Arques v. Nat. Superior Co., 67 Cal. App. (2d) 763,
155 P. (2d) 643 (1945); history sheet, Waters v. Kings County Trust Co., (C.C.A.
2d, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 680, cert. den., 323 U.S. 769, 65 S.Ct. 121 (1944); employment records, Klat v. Chrysler Corp., 285 Mich. 241, 280 N.W. 747 (1938).
20
Broker's listing card, Weimann v. Sheppard, (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1944) 37 A.
(2d) 847; card listing insurance receipts, Grogan v. Michael, 349 Pa. 369, 37 A. (2d)
715 (1944); card listing rental receipts, Rapp v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th, 1944)
146 F. (2d) 548; hotel registration card, Valli v. United States, (C.C.A. 1st, 1938)
94 F. (2d) 687, cert. dismissed, 304 U.S. 586, 58 S.Ct. 1053 (1938); time card,
People v. Richardson, 74 Cal. App. (2d) 528, 169 P. (2d)·44 (1946).
14
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were bills of lading, invoices, the production records of a manufacturing
concern, and of an oil well. 21 Letters, inter office memoranda, and a
memorandum of a telephone conversation were admitted. 22 Finally,
a number of assorted items such as daily oil gauge, reports, insurance
applications, laundry tags, order folders, and a ship's log were held
admissible. 28
b. Medical records. The courts varied in their attitude toward the
admissibility of hospital records under the common law exception.24
A trend toward admission has been given fresh impetus in jurisdictions
adopting the statutory modifications. Items admitted, under these statutes, have run the gamut of hospital activities. The admission card,
bedside notes of a physician, case histories of patients, a nurse's chart,
· and the birth record of a child have been put in evidence.25 The ready
admission of such items as a cardiogram, clinical charts of temperature,
pulse, and respiration, an electro-encephalogram, a record of hypo21

Bill of lading, United States v. Kessler, (D.C. Pa. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 964;
invoices, United States v. Garvey, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 767; United
States v. Kaibney, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 155 F. (2d) 795; production records of a
manufacturing concern, In re Eisenberg, (C.C.A. 3d, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 160; and of
an oil well, Doyle v. Chief Oil Co., 64 Cal. App. (2d) 284, 148 P. (2d) 915 (1944).
22
Letters, Sheehan v. Municipal Light & Power Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 151 F.
{2d) 65. But compare the exclusion of letters in Amtorg Trading Co. v. Higgins,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 536; Everts v. Matteson, 68 Cal. App. {2d) 577,
157 P. (2d) 651 (1945). Inter office memo admitted, Henderson v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 65 Idaho 570, 149 P. (2d) 133 (1944); and memoranda of a telephone
conversation, United States v. Moran, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 151 F. (2d) 661.
28
Daily oil gauge reports, Doyle v. Chief Oil Co., 64 Cal. App. (2d) 284, 148
P. (2d) 915 (1944); insurance applications, Davidson v. John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 152 Pa. Super. 63, 31 A. (2d) 585 (1943); laundry tags, Oakland California Towel Co. v. Zanes, (Cal. App. 1947) 184 P. (2d) 21; order folders, Publishers'
Book Bindery Co. v. Ziegelheim, 184 Misc. 559, 54 N.Y.S. (2d) 798 (1945); ship's
log book, Zurich v. Wehr, (C.C.A. 3d, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 791; Gelderman v. Munson Steamship Line, 232 App. Div. 776, 249 N.Y.S. 920 (1931).
24
Courts rejecting them did so either as not coming within the scope of" the
exception, or, in a given case, by a strict insistence on the technical prerequisites of the
exception •.Hale, "Hospital Records as Evidence,» 14 So. CAL. L. REV. 99 (1941);
38 M1cH. L. REV. 219 (1939). Either position would be almost equally fatal to
admission for difficulties inherent in the proof of business records. Notes 5-8, supra,
inhere also in hospital records.
25
Admission card, Gile v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358, 272 N.W. 706 (1937);
Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E. (2d) 245 (1947); bedside notes, Ribarin v.
Kessler, 78 Ohio App. 289, 70 N.E. (2d) 107 (1946); case histories, BethlehemSparrows Point Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, (Md. 1946) 50 A. (2d) 256; People v.
Kohlmeyer, 284 N.Y. 366, 31 N.E. (2d) 490 (1940); Conlon v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 56 R.I. 88, 183 A. 850 (1936); nurse's chart, Loper v. Morrison, 23 Cal. (2d) 600, 145 P. (2d) 1 (1944); birth record, Yager v. Yager, 313
Mich. 300, 21 N.W. (2d) 138 (1946).
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dermic injections, and a prescription,2° indicates that records of specific
physical facts, as opposed to opinion or diagnosis, 21 are most likely to
win approval.
In addition to recordations within the hospital itself, office records
of a practicing physician, and records of a visiting nurse, have been
admitted under this heading. 28
c. Governmental records. Under the "Public Records" exception
to the hearsay rule a number of governmental reports were admissible
at common law. 20 This exception, like the one relating to business
entries, was too narrow, and too encumbered with petty rules to operate adequately in aid of proof.30 Significantly, several recent cases have
ruled in favor of the admissibility of governmental records under the
business entries statutes. For example, county relief records, a food
analysis by a state chemist, a monthly labor report by a state department of public works employee, a birth certificate by a state bureau
of vital statistics, a blood test by a state board of health, records of
a state school for mental deficients, and a post office form have been
26
Cardiogram and prescription, Freedman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 342
Pa. 404, 21 A. (2d) 81 (1941); clinical charts, Gile v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358, 272
N.W. 706 (1937); electro-encephalogram, Mayole v. B. Crystal & Sons, 266 App.
Div. 1008, 44 N.Y.S. (2d) 4n (1943); "shots," Wilson v. State, 243 Ala. 1, 8 S.
(2d) 422 (1942). Clearly the record of the cost of the medical treatment should fall
within the statutory exception, Ducat v. Goldner, 77 Cal. App. 332, 175 P. (2d) 914
(1.946).
27
Compare the vigorous argument in New York Life .Ins. Co. v. Taylor, (App.
D.C. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 297, over the admissibility of a diagnosis by a psychiatrist
on a psychoneurotic condition. The majority thought the opinion too conjectural to be
admitted without cross-examination. A statement that the patient suffered from "Alcoholism" was rejected where the entrant had not been shown to be a qualified
medical expert, Lane v. Samuels, 350 Pa. 446, 39 A. (2d) 626 (1944). The problem
is examined at some length in 38 M1cH. L. REv. 219 (1939).
28
Office records, Freedman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 342 Pa. 404, 21 A.
(2d) 81 (1941); nurs~ records, McCarthy v. Maxon, (Conn. 1947) 55 A. (2d)
912. In about three-fifths of the states certain confidential communications between
physician and patient are privileged by statute, Hale, "Hospital Records as Evidence,"
14 So. CAL. L. REv. 99 at 108 (1941). A question then arises as to whether the
adoption of one of the business entry statutes repeals or modifies this privilege. It has
been held in Ohio that, absent waiver, physician-patient communications carried into
a hospital record would still be privileged, Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.
(2d) 24-5 (1947). A Michigan statute provided for the admission in evidence of duly
filed death certificates prepared by a physician. An argnment that the physicianpatient privilege extended to communications carried into the death certificate was
rejected, Krapp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 143 Mich. 369, 106 N.W. no7
(1906). Hale examines the issue in his article, supra, p. 108 et seq.
29
5 W1cMoRE, EvmENcE, 3d ed., § 1630 et seq. (1940).
80
A number of state statutes were aimed at removing some of the restrictions.
Amplifying on these, Professor Wigmore suggested a uniform statute liberalizing the
common law exception. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1638 (1940).
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held admissible.31 In view of the advantages gained by thus extending
the types of admissible entries, and simplifying their proof, it may be
expected that further attempts will be made to bring this type of record
within the statutory scope.
d. Army and Navy records. A goodly proportion of our present
population have themselves, or have relatives who have, Army or Navy
service records. Inevitably, litigation turning on proof of facts relating
to such service will increase. Already there have been admitted in
evidence a discharge certificate from the Navy, a death certificate from
the Secretary of War, a certificate compiled by a Rear Admira1 in the
Coast Guard, letters and telegrams from a commanding officer in the
Army, and records from a Marine Hospital.32 Hence precedent exists
for the introduction of a growing number of Army and Navy records
under the business entries statutes.
e. Miscellaneous r;cords. Litigants have sought to bring r.ecords
compiled in an assorted group of occupations and callings before the
court. Successful to date have been an accountant's chart, a coroner's
death certificate, a document prepared by a process server, and the
minutes and cash books for a church.33 Although the lawyer and the
policeman have so far been singularly unsuccessful in these attempts,34
31
Relief records, Brown v. County of Los Angeles, 77 Cal. App. 903, 176 P. (2d)
753 (1947); food analysis, Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A. (2d)
224 (1938); labor report, Gelbin v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R., (C.C.A. 2d, 1933) 62
F. (2d) 500; birth certificate, Pollack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1943)
138 F. {2d) 123; blood test, Wilson v. State, 243 Ala. 1, 8 S. (2d) 422 (1942);
school records, Hall v. State, 248 Ala. 3 3, 26 S. ( 2d) 566 ( I 946) ; post office forms,
Dias v. Farm Bureau Mutual Fire Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1946) 155 F. (2d) 788.
32
Discharge, Gunter v. Claggett, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 636, 151 P. (2d) 271
(1944); death certificate, letters and telegrams from a commanding officer, Bebbington v. California Western States Life Ins. Co., (Cal. App. 1946) 171 P. (2d) 495.
Compare Lundblad v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 397 (1943), excluding a letter from
a military officer. Certificate by Coast Guard Officer admitted, United States v.
Conti, (D.C. Mass. 1946) 64 F. Supp. 187, and Marine l).ospital records, Ulm v.
:Jl4oore-McCormack Lines, (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) II5 F. (2d) 492.
33
Accountant's chart, United States v. Mortimer, (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) II8 F. (2d)
266, cert. den., 314 U.S. 616, 62 S.Ct. 58 (1941); coroner's death certificate, Hunter
v. Derby Foods, (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 970; but statements in a coroner's
certificate based on what the court considered an insufficient foundation were rejected,
Nelson v. Lee, (Ala. 1947) 32 S. (2d) 22; Shiovitz v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 281 Mich.
382, 275 N.W. 181 (1937). Process server's report admitted, DeHart v. Allen, 26
Cal. (2d) 829, 161 P. (2d) 453 (1945); also church books, Zinaman v. Stivelman,
272 N.Y. 580, 4 N.E. (2d) 813 (1936).
34 Entries in a lawyer's case record card were rejected in Matter of Roge v.
Valentine, 255 App. Div. 475, 7 N.Y.S. (2d) 958 (1938); and an attorney's record
rejected in Buckley v. Altheimer, (C.C.A. 7th, 1945) 152 F. (2d) 502. The Supreme
Court was worried over the too ready introduction of records prepared by law firms
in handling their business, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477 (1943).
In Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930), one of the earliest cases
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there appears to be no definitive objection to bringing their case, or any
other "business, profession, occupation and calling," 85 within the acts.

3. Conclusion
Obviously, present statutory modifications of the business entry
exception do not make relevant that which is irrelevant; nor competent
that which is incompetent.86 To some extent, however, they may have
worked an erosion on the hearsay rule itself. 37 But clearly there has
been a two-fold expansion of the exception: vertically in the types of
human activity which may now be regarded as encompassed within it;
and horizontally in the kinds of records which may be considered "business entries." 38 Certain it is that the last step is yet to be taken,80 and
arising under the Model Act, a police report based on statements of bystanders at an
accident was rejected. McWilliams v. Lewis, (App. D.C. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 200,
admitted a police report. An attempt to admit a police photograph of the defendant,
containing notations on the back, as a business entry failed in Clainos v. United States,
(App. D.C. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 593.
35
Note 9, supra. See also, 35 CAL. L. REv. 434 (1947); Ii: BROOKLYN L. REv.
78 (1941).
.
36
Nor do they make the record immune to other standard evidentiary objections
such as that the entry is "self serving." Schmitt v. Daehler Die Casting Co., 143 Ohio
St. 421, 55 N.E. (2d) 644 (1944). Nor is the opinion without a proper foundation.
Nelson v. Lee, (Ala. 1947) 32 S. (2d) 22; Shiovitz v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 281 Mich.
382, 275 N.W. 181 (1937); Lane v. Samuels, 350 Pa. 446, 39 A. (2d) 626 (1944),
or unreliable, notes 3 7 and 40, infra.
37
Controversy rages hottest around this issue. The important point is absence
of cross examination. B is told by A that A received an injury, from which A later
dies, in the course of his employment. In a suit on behalf of A's estate in a jurisdiction
relaxing the hearsay rule in Workman's Compensation cases, held, B may testify as to
A's statement, but B's testimony is entirely without probative value. Carroll v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916). On the same facts
except that B incorporates A's statement in a written record of A's subsequent medical
treatment, in a jurisdiction having the Model Act in force, held, that portion of the
record containing A's statement is inadmissible [Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 280 Mich.
378, 273 N.W. 737 (1937)]; the complete record, including A's statement, is
admissible, Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, (Md. 1946) 50 A.
(2d) 256 (1946). Compare Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477 (1943)
rejecting the routine accident report of D's deceased engineer. See comments by
Maguire, 56 HARV. L. REv. 458 (1943); Morgan, "The Law of Evidence, 19411945," 59 HARV. L. REV. 481 (1946).
38
A court desiring to exclude entries may do so by definition, that the entry was
not made in a type of activity which might be considered a "business" (stenographer
held not engaged in any business within the meaning of the Act), Ingram v. City of
Pittsburgh, 346 Pa. 45, 29 A. (2d) 32 (1942); or if made within a "business" the
entry did not pertain to such "business" and hence was not a "business entry," Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477 (1943); entry in hospital record that
deceased was "shot by a white man" not an entry made in the regular course of (hospital) business, Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 325, 41 A. (2d) 688 (1945).
89
Mr. Barrow of the Illinois Bar suggested in "Business Entries before the Court,"
32 ILL. L. REV. 334 (1937), some modifications of both acts. The American Law
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that the courts have been slow to adopt the position suggested by proponents of reform "that one question only would govern the admissibility of business records. Was the writing or record made in the
regular course of business?" 40 Nevertheless, proof of "many of the
simplest things of life," and some of the more complex ones, has been
greatly simplified, and a tool has been fashioned for the resourceful
attorney, who, faced with an apparently hopeless problem in documentary proof, may successfully salvage his case by bringing it within
the statutory exception.41
John M. Veale, S.Ed.

Institute in their Model Code of Evidence, Rule 514 (1942) substantially followed
the Model Act for the Proof of Business Transactions but provided the trial judge with
discretion to rule out unreliable records. Suggestion has been made that the Wisconsin
statutes be amended to conform closely to the American Law Institute proposals, Filachek and Spohn, "Business Entries,and the Like," 1947 Wis. L. REv. 96.
40 14 M1cH. S.B.J. 35 at 36 (1934). Should this be,the only test? The rationale
of the common law rules was expressed in the theory that "it is the truth telling habit
of such business records that makes them admissible. • • • The law therefore does not
turn its back on them when in. search of truth. Moreover, it realizes that the identity
of the recorder has not much to say in the ordinary case as to the truth of the
record. It is rather its purpose, character, manner of keeping and the habit and necessity for trutli telling that makes for its competency as evidence••••" Tiedt v. Larsen,
174 Minn. 558 at 564, 219 N.W; 905 (1928).
But the common law exception was based upon the presumed authenticity of the
types of entries then encompassed within it. The statutes, however, have rendered
admissible a whole host of new types of entries whose trustworthiness is untested by
tune; see in particular notes 27 and 37, supra, without cross-examination, and without
any mechanics for barring untrustworthy records. Faced with this problem the Supreme
Court in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 at II4, 63 S.Ct. 477 (1943) invoked a
judicial limitation embodied in a test of admissibility based on "the character of the
records and their earmarks of reliability•.••" This was considered an unnecessary
restriction of the statutes by some: Maguire, "Hoffman v. Palmer," 56 HARV. L. REv.
458 (1943); Morgan, "The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945," 59 HARV. L. REV. 481
(1946); and commended by others, 43 CoL. L. REv. 392 (1943). Significantly, the
American Law Institute in their Model Code of Evidence provided just such a judicial
limitation, by giving the trial judge discretion to rule out unreliable records. Note 39,
supra.
41 Stella Cheese Co. v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R.R. Co., 248
Wis. 196, 21 N.W. (2d) 655 (1946).

